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Xenophanes of Colophon (fl. 530 B.C.) is thought to have been the first sceptic
in the history of western philosophy, but the character of his scepticism was the sub
ject of dispute as early as the fourth century B.C., and the central statement of his
position. Fragment 34^·, has been variously interpreted ever since. Much of recent
discussion has concerned the severity and scope of his sceptical thesis, but it would
be of equal philosophical interest to know what Xenophanes' reasons were for maintain
ing scepticism, or what features of Xenophanes' life and times may have contributed to
his sceptical outlook. It is the contention of this paper that Xenophanes' scepticism
is best understood as a response to traditional religious and poetic ways of thinking,
and is therefore closely tied to his criticisms of Homeric religion, and that the key
to a proper understanding of his sceptical remarks lies in an often mentioned but sel
dom discussed aspect of his writings: the attack on divination.
I - Ancient Accounts
The following extract from Xenophanes' poetry was widely quoted and discussed
in antiquity (B 34):
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While a full translation requires argument and cannot be assumed at the outset, it is
clear that the basic elements of Xenophanes' view are (in some sense of these terms):
truth (to saphes), knowing (iden, eidôs, oide), speaking of the real (tetelesmenon
eipon), and belief or seeming (dokos). Any adequate interpretation of Xenophanes'
scepticism, while it can be supplemented by reference to other fragments and back
ground information, must make sense' of these notions, and their inter-connections.
Sextus mentions two alternative interpretations: in the first,^ Xenophanes is thought
to have held that everything is incomprehensible (panta akatalëpta), and this is sup
ported by reading saphes as 'true' or 'known':
Yet the true and known — - at least in respect of non-evident things *—
no human being knows; for even if by
chance he should hit upon it, still
he knows not that he has hit upon it
but imagines and opines.
As the context, of Sextus' discussion (VII, 46-52) makes clear, the sceptical dispute
concerns not so much the attaining of true belief, but a criterion (criterion) for
determining which beliefs are true or which appearances are veridical. Xenophanes is
taken here to be denying the existence of a criterion since he holds that even if
someone were to say what is real or true, he would not know that he had done so, and
hence would have only belief or opinion.
But this interpretation of the fragment is implausible. Not only does it re
strict, without justification, the scope of
the sceptical thesis to whatis 'nonevident' , but it translates Xenophanes' simple "he knows not" (ouk oide) into "he
knows not that he has hit upon it" (ouk oide hoti eplbebleken autôi), and requires
that we attribute to Xenophanes the rather subtle doctrine that knowing the truth
entails knowing that one knows the truth, or at least that knowing the truth entails
being convinced (pepeismenos) that what one believes is true. It is doubtful, at
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least in English, that either entailment holds, but they are not so far fetched as to
exclude being attributed to Xenophanes. The difficulty is simply that both are more
complex formulations than the original "even if he says what is true, he does not
know". Further, since saphes and alethes are not synonyms, Xenophanes’ scepticism
could be directed toward ’certain’, ’absolute', or 'sure' knowledge, rather than know
ledge of the truth simpliciter.
Sextus mentions a second, less sceptical, interpretation of this sort: Xeno
phanes does not deny all comprehension or apprehension (katalipsis) of the truth, but
only that which is episfemonikëh and adiaptôton (Bury: "cognitive and inerrant").
Hen can apprehend the truth, even if they cannot attain it with certainty — or with
out reservations (pagiou) — and we can adopt probable reasoning as a criterion for
determining what is true (VII, 110). This reading gains some support from Fr. 35:
"let these things be believed as resembling the truth (eoikota tois etumoisi)” . Yet
we must still assume that Xenophanes' concern was also that of the later sceptics: the
existence of a criterion for distinguishing between truth and falsity (or reality and
deceptive appearance) and we are also required to attribute to Xenophanes some general
notion of apprehension of which knowledge and belief are distinct species. Both in
terpretations given by Sextus constitute expansions in the language of a later period,
and in the context of a dispute of which, for all we know, Xenophanes may have been
wholly ignorant. So far we may reasonably conclude only that Xenophanes denies that
men have knowledge (or perhaps that men have knowledge of to saphes) while he allows
that men have beliefs which, in some cases, may resemble what is true or real
(etumoisi).
Later writers,tell us that Xenophanes coupled the distinction between knowledge
and mere belief with a contrast between divine and human capacities : god knows the
truth, but belief is alloted to men,5 and Alcmaeon begins his work with a similar re
mark, perhaps following Xenophanes; "concerning the non-evident, concerning things
mortal, the gods have a clear understanding (saphëneian), but men merely conjecture
from signs."o As Snell has shown in detail, there was by Xenophanes’ time a wellestablished poetic tradition contrasting divine knowledge and human ignorance,^ and
the attribution of this view to Xenophanes is supported by the frequent, and often
disparaging, remarks about the beliefs of mortals (B14: brotoi; B18, B36: thnetoisi),
and by his conception of the one God, superior to gods and men,unlike them in body
and mind (B23), who moves things by his mind (B25), and who enjoys, in some sense, a
whole or complete seeing, thinking and hearing (B24). We have so far no reason to
think that B34, taken by itself, reflects this religious context (although I shall
argue for this in Section III following), but we can reasonably conclude on the basis
of the evidence already cited, that Xenophanes' scepticism has this feature: as
Guthrie puts it, "men could have no certain knowledge, that was reserved for God"
(ibid., p . 398).
II - Recent Accounts

8

In Karl Popper's famous "Back to the Pre-Socratics", Xenophanes is alleged to
have held that "all our knowledge is guesswork, yet that we may nevertheless, by
searching for that knowledge ’which is the better’ find it in the course of time."
Popper sees Xenophanes, as did the early Greek sceptics, as an early proponent of his
own theory of knowledge: "that knowledge proceeds by way of conjectures and refuta
tions", and not according to the Baconian myth of induction. Popper concedes that it
may sound incredible, but asserts anyway, that there is a clear recognition of this
"theory of rational knowledge almost immediately after the practice of critical dis
cussion had begun." (ibid). But even conceding for the moment that Xenophanes did
think of human understanding as progressing toward but never attaining knowledge of
the 'final truth', we are still very far from being told;that knowledge is obtained
not simply from observation, and experiment, but from the construction and criticism
of theories.® According to Diogenes Laertius, Xenophanes held opinions which were
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cized the accounts given by Homer and Hesiod. There is no evidence that he held, as
Aristotle clearly did hold, that inquiry was best conducted by a review and criticism
of previous doctrines and theories. ® Nor do the remaining fragments reveal that he
implicitly followed this principle; apart from one allusion to the Pythagorean doc
trine of metempsychosis (B7) and a suggestion that he admired Thales for his ability
to predict eclipses (B19), there is no sign that he practiced, much less preached.
Popper's principle of 'rational knowledge*.
Yet Popper's account raises an issue that has clear relevance for an interpre
tation of Xenophanes' scepticism: how can Xenophanes be a proponent of scepticism if
he holds also (in B18) that "mortals in time, through seeking, discover what is bet
ter (or the better)"? Can one consistently deny the possibility of knowledge and at
the same time affirm that discovery is possible? Further, as FrMnkel asks, how can
we consistently think of Xenophanes, "this investigator and portrayer of reality who
took delight in the gathering and contemplation of facts" as one who was also "a
sceptic, a tired doubter or a deft but unconvinced dialectician, and that he had no
real confidence in the reality of the world of appearances?" (p. 122). Neither of
these considerations poses an unavoidable dilemma. Xenophanes does not say, as Popper
has i t , H that men find "that knowledge which is thé better", but only that they dis
cover what is better, and as Guthrie explains; the replacement of divine revelation
with human inquiry, which is the full thesis Of Fr. 18, may represent Xenophanes * re
jection of a primitive 'golden race', and the promotion of a conception of human pro
gress or improvement 'both morally and in the conditions of life* (p. 400). In any
event, there is no inconsistency generated by holding that men fall short of certain
knowledge, or even knowledge simpliciter, while also conceding that men discover arts,
skills, values, or beliefs which are better than previous ones. Similarly, one need
not, in order to be justly termed a sceptic, affirm a universal doubt, or a rejection
of the evidence of the senses. FrMnkel's argument rests on the frequently adopted
but mistaken assumption that a sceptic, worthy of the name, must be a pyrrhonian
sceptic, that is, must call for a suspension of belief, or perhaps even a rejection
of all beliefs as false. There have however been sceptics, as ancient as Carneades
and as recent as Keith Lehrer, who deny that we ever know anything, but insist none
theless that much ought to be believed as true, nob the least of which are the
beliefs about the world based on the obvious evidence of sense experience. There is
no contradiction in asserting that p is true, or ought to be believed, even though p
is not something which should be claimed to be known, or known with certainty. ^
Con
sequently, we cannot hope to show that Xenophanes was not really a sceptic simply on
the grounds that one form of scepticism would be incompatible with other aspects of
his philosophy.
FrMnkel's interpretation is however based largely on linguistic considerations
involving B34 itself, and since FrMnkel's account is shared, at least in part, by
Snell, Guthrie, and Untersteiner, and presents a detailed exegesis, it deserves care
ful consideration.
FrMnkel views B34 as an expression of a 'robust empiricism1, and, far from
denying the possibility of knowledge, it holds that knowledge which is empirically
grounded, based on first-hand observation and experience, can be certain and exhaus
tive (saphes). To know, as can be seen in Herodotus1 notion of historie, is to have
seen, and this close connection of knowing with seeing is borne out by the etymology
of oida, literally "I have seen” , but commonly simply "I know". Thus Xenophanes is
not rejecting knowledge, but only the pretensions to knowledge of one who has not
seen things for himself (autos ouk oide). Since we have no first-hand experience of
divine attributes and operations, we can have no reliable knowledge of them, but
there are plausible suppositions that can be made.
This interpretation makes some sense, and we are indebted to FrMnkel for his
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malista tvchoi) which went un-nùticed in earlier commentaries, but his rendering is
not without difficulties. Let us assume for the sake of argument that iden in line 1
(kai to men oun saphes outis anër iden oude tis estai) does mean seeing, and in parti
cular non-raetaphorical 'seeing* — i.e. visual sense perception, ^ and also that this
justifies reading eidtrs in line 2 (eidos amphi theôn te kàihassa lego peri panton) as
"designating only a knowing rooted in vision" (p. 123).14 We must then take Xenophanes
thesis to be that 'what is clear or precise (saphes) no man has ever perceived, nor
will there ever be anyone who knows on the basis of empirical observations about the
gods and about everything else of which I speak'. We can understand why Xenophanes
might have held that the gods could not be perceptually known, and hence why it was
not possible to have perceptual knowledge about everything of which he spoke, but why
should he have thought that no man has ever had perceptual knowledge of what is saphes,
especially if he is willing to allow that sense perception is the source of that know
ledge which is certain and exhaustive? The problem is that while the second line dis
cusses knowledge specifically about the gods and everything else of which Xenophanes
speaks, the first line is unrestricted: no man has ever seen to saphes. To repair
the interpretation, so far as I can see, we have only the alternative of thinking that
the restriction explicit in line 2, is really implicit in line 1: what is saphes
(about the gods and everything else) no man has ever p e r c e i v e d . T h i s is not however
a reading that could be easily adopted consistent with FrHnkel's reminder that "early
paratactic style first introduces all those parts necessary to the grammatical struc
ture before adding anything further" (ibid., p. 123). If Xenophanes had really in
tended to restrict the scope of the saphes which no man has seen to only that about
the gods and everything else of which he speaks, this stylistic consideration suggests
that he would have done so immediately rather than waiting until he extended his claim
to include all future men as well. The problem remains: how can we reconcile Xeno
phanes' initial blanket rejection of men having discerned what is saphes, with Fran
kel' s thesis that Xenophanes' viewed perception as the means for discerning what is
saphes?
A similar difficulty for FrHnkel's interpretation emerges from the generality
of Xenophanes' conclusion in line 4: dokos d* epi pasi tetuktai: belief (or supposi
tion) is allotted to all things. This remark is at odds with FrHnkel's contention
that Xenophanes* is concerned to deny only knowledge of the supersensible world, and
counts as well against thinking that Xenophanes allows for the possibility of know
ledge based on sense experience. If Xenophanes meant to deny only knowledge of the
supersensible, one would expect him to claim that belief is allotted to these things
(and not all things), and if he did think that men could gain reliable knowledge in
some manner, one would not expect him to conclude "but belief is allotted to all
things". In short, although lines 2 and 3 might by themselves suggest that Xenophanes'
scepticism was directed only against second-hand 'knowledge' of the supersensible
world, lines 1 and 4 indicate a general scepticism about the capacity human beings to
see the clear and certain truth, and a willingness to concede only that men can attain
true beliefs. Xenophanes was probably not the extreme sceptic that Sotion took him to
be, but he still seems more of a sceptic than FrMnkel would have us believe.
Ill - Xenophanes and Early Greek Religion
We have so* far been thinking of Xenophanes as the originator of a cryptic epis
temological theory, and have considered that theory through the accounts given by later
writers, both ancient and modern. It is however very unlikely, as Charles Kahn has
observed, that either of these ways of viewing a pre-Socratic philosopher, will provide
a complete picture:
The very possibility of understanding sixty-century ideas, where the docu
mentation is so sadly lacking, depends upon our fuller knowledge of the
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regions of light provided by archaic poetry on one hand and classical phi
losophy on the other — by thus illuminating them, as it were, from above
as well as from below — that we may have any hope of seeing a bit deeper
into this dark period of transition and creation.
It is true that Kahn's inquiry concerns the origins of Milesian cosmology, and he may
not have intended these remarks to apply to other pre-Socratics, but there is ample
justification for adopting this approach in our investigation of Xenophanes' scepti
cism. Xenophanes was after all a wandering poet who criticized the stories about the
gods told by Homer and Hesiod (Al, Bll), and testified to the extent of Homer's influ
ence on common opinion (BIO: ex arches kath* Homeron enei memathekasi pantes...). In
what ways might the poetic tradition of Homer and Hesiod have influenced Xenophanes'
thinking, and especially, how might the religious outlook of the older poets link up
with his views on human knowledge?
.We have already noted that B34 probably embodies, or at least is connected with,
a traditional poetic contrast between divine wisdom and human ignorance, but there are
other features of Homeric religion which were repudiated by Xenophanes. He rejects
the conception of gods in human form (Bll, B14) and conceives of one god, greatest
among gods and men who is unlike men both in body and mind (B23). One insufficiently
appreciated feature of Xenophanes' critique of religion is his repudiation of religi
ous practices, and not simply religious conceptions. He expresses scorn for the prac
tice of placing pine branches around the house in the belief that these branches are
somehow themselves bakchoi — divine powers (B17), and we are told by Diogenes Laer
tius that he rebuked (katapsasthai) Epimenides. a man who enjoyed a reputation as a
prophet and miracle worker.1^ According to AetiuslS and Cicero·*·® Xenophanes denounced
the practice of divination (mantike-), the attempt to acquire knowledge through the use
of omens and portents of various sorts.20 This feature of Xenophanes* writings, the
attack on divination and related superstitious practices, furnishes, I believe, a
basis for a coherent account of his general philosophical outlook, and his scepticism.
If I am right about this, then we can not only make sense of some troublesome frag
ments, we can also appreciate the origins of his sceptical outlook, and the signifi
cance of the intellectual revolution which was effected by Xenophanes, and by the preSocratic philosophers generally.
Xenophanes' rejection of divination is, first of all, not unconnected with other
aspects of his thought. It is a reasonable inference from his conception of god as
unlike mortals in rainement, voice, or body, that the gods do not appear in mortal
form, nor do they speak directly to us. Nor, since it is unfitting for the god to be
in different places at different times (B14, 26), is it possible for god to 'come or
go in our midst' (meterchesthai in B26), Yet, as Flaceliere states "...genuine
mantikg, in the original sense of the word (mania: madness) [is] caused by possession,
by the literal presence of the god in the soul of the prophet or prophetess, who thus
receives the revelation direct from heaven."21 FrSnkel observes that in the attack on
divination, Xenophanes "made the chasm between the here and the beyond unbridgeable"
(p, 130), but the chasm had already been provided for in Xenophanes' positive account
of the one god.
Nor is the attack on divination unconnected with Xenophanes' cosmology in which
celestial phenomena are explained in terms of watery or fiery clouds, and everything
else is explained in terms of water and earth (B29), or perhaps simply earth (B27).
Nilsson's account of the conflict between religious and philosophical ways of thinking
which was a general feature of pre-Socratic philosophy, and which led to the diminished
influence of seers and oracles, serves equally well as an explanation of the connection
between Xenophanes' critique of divination and his cosmology:
The real clash took place between that part of religion which interfered
most in practical life and with which everyone came into contact every
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natural philosophy to give physical explanations of celestial and
atmospheric phenomena, or portents, and other events. Such explana
tions undermined the belief in the art of the seers and made it super
fluous. For if these phenomena wore to be explained in a natural way,
the art of the seers came to naught. *
That Xenophanes' Oosmology had this anti-divinational flavor is indicated by several
isolated remarks about traditional portents, as well as the subjects of his cosmolo
gical interest. So far as I know, only Dodds has noticed the connection: [Xenophanes
gives] ’'naturalistic explanations of the rainbow (Fr. 32) and St. Elmo's fire (A39),
both of which are traditional portents."22 Rainbows are among the most striking and
suggestive of all natural phenomena, arid have been taken as harbingers of good fortune,
but for Xenophanes, "she whom they call Iris, she too is actually a cloud, purple, and
flame red, and yellow to behold" (B32). St. Elmo's fire, the freak electrical pheno
menon sometimes seen on ships' masts during storms, was considered a portent of good
fortune, and was thought of in antiquity as two brothers (Dioscuri, later Cabiri) whc
were the guardian saints of mariners in distress,23 but to Xenophanes, "those Which
some call the Dioscuri are little clouds glimmering in virtde of the kind of motion
that they have" (A39, Guthrie trâns.).
Flaceliere presents the following brief summary of the phenomena which were
taken as Omens or portents :
Atmospheric phenomena, meteora. were obviously-signs of the will of the
gods; especially of Zeus, the god of the atmosphere and the sky. The
weightiest presage of all, the one that could negate or confirm all
others, was thunder. In the Iliad, whenever Zeus wishes to encourage
one of the Greek or Trojan heroes he does so by hurling a thunderbolt
' to the right of him. Rain also comes from Zeus, and Was regarded as a
sign of his will, a diosemeion. But beyond the clouds and all Other
; atmospheric phenomena were the stars: in Homer, Sirius, 'Orion's Dog',
was a star of ill-omen; the Spartans would never embark on a campaign
before the full moon, which appears to be the reason why they did not
arrive at Marathon until the battle was over.^
Among other celestial phenomena thought of as omens or portents were eclipses, shooting
stars, And the phases of the moon. The industrious mantic seer could find significance
in dreams, sneezes; volcanic eruptions, the sounds of gongs and rustling branches, the
entrails of sacrificed animals, birds, and the casting of dice or bones.25 While the
explanátionS which Xenophanes gives are neither detailed nor always consistent, they
do focus on many phenomena involved in the practice of divination:1
6
5
4
3
2
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

"He says that the sun and the stars come from clouds" (A32, Plut.
Strom. 4. cf. A33, 38, 40).
"Xenophanes said there are many sixns and moons according to regions,
sections, and zones of the earth, and that at a certain time the
disc is banished into some section of the earth not inhabited by us,
and so treading on nothing, as it were, produces the phenomenon of
an eclipse" (A41a, Aetius, Placita, II, 24, 9).
"Eclipses occur by extinction of the sun (sbesin hgliou) and the
sun is born anew at each of its risings" (A41, Aet., II, 24, 4).
"The moon disappears each month because it Is extinguished" (A43,
Aet. II, 25, 4).
"Comets (cometas) are groups or motions of burning clouds" (À44,
Aet. Ill, 2, II).
"Lightnings (astrapas) take place when clouds shine in motion" (A45,
Aet. Ill, 3, 6).
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"The phenomena of the heavens come from the warmth of the sun as the
principié' cause. For when the moisture is drawn from the sea, the
sweet water separated by reason of its lightness becomes mist and
passes into clouds, and falls as rain when compressed, and the winds
scatter it*’ (A46,.Aet. Ill, 4, 4).

Epicurus, whose naturalistic explanations of these phenomena resemble both in content
and terminology those given by Xenophanes1
states explicitly what seems to me to be
an implicit conclusion of Xenophanes' account:
We are bound to believe that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses,
risings and settings, and the like, take place without the ministration
or command, either now or in the future, of any being who at the same time
enjoys perfect bliss along with immortality. 27
In short, Xenophanes' cosmology, as well as his conception of the one god, probably
served to support his attack on divination through signs: men personify natural phe
nomena and think of them as visible signs of the will of the gods, but they are in
reality only changes due to the motion of clouds and the kindling and extinction of
fires. The true divinity exists elsewhere.
These inter-connections do not, taken in isolation, show that Xenophanes' epis
temological remarks have anything to do with the practice of divination but they do
suggest that his rejection of divination was not devoid of philosophical importance.
Further, since divination is essentially a means for acquiring knowledge we ought at
least consider the possibility (though this has never, to my knowledge, been attempted)
that these two aspects of Xenophanes' thought are related in some important way to one
another. The crucial question is whether B34 is itself illuminated by drawing atten
tion to the attack on divination, and to the significance attached to divination in
the poetic tradition.
We can begin by considering Xenophanes' reason for concluding that no man has
séen or known what is saphes (and that there never will be anyone who knows about the
gods and everything else of which he speaks):
ei gar kai ta malísta tvchoi tetelesmenon eipôn autos hornos ouk oide
As FrHnkel has argued, we need not think of tvchoi (eipSh) simply as 'chanced' (to say)
or 'accidentally' (said), but rather as 'succeeded* (in saying), or 'correctly' (say
ing). Thus (taking ta malista as 'especially' or 'more than others') ta malista tychoi
eipôn means 'succeed above others in saying'.28
What then can be made of tetelesmenon:"for even if someone should succeed above
all others in saying what is tetelesmenon. still he would not know"? Tetelesmenon has
been understood as the 'complete truth' or 'what is completely true' (Kirk and Raven,
Freeman, Burnet) or simply as 'true' (Guthrie), or 'what is really present' (FrMnkel),
but the literal meaning of tetelesmenos, 'what is completed, accomplished, brought
about' (from teleô) has been largely ignored.29 So far as I can determine, tetelesmenos
occurs twenty-three times in Homer.30 in eighteen of these passages, it is linked with
speaking or saying, and the following passages illustrate this repeated formulaic ex
pression, "speaking of that which has been brought about or will be brought about"
(Murray trans.):1
2
(1)

(2)

"for this will I speak and verily this thing shall be brought to pass"
(to de kai tetelesmenon estai). II. I, 212 « II, 257; VIII, 401, VIII,
454; Od. II, 187, XVII, 229, VIII, 82.
"He arose an<i spoke a threatening word,1that hath now been brought to
pass" (ho dô tetelesmenos esti), I I . I, 388.
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"I will declare to thee as it verily shall be brought to pass" ( hxss
kai tetelesmenon estai). II. m i l , 4 1 0 = XVI, 440, XXIII, 672, XIX,
.487.
■
, ~
.
· ’ ·.
(4) "I would that this word of thine might be fulfilled" (epos teteles
menon eië), Od. XV,' 536 » XVII, 163, XIX, 303.
.
(3)

This passage from the Odyssey (XVII, 153 ■££*) gives an indication of the sort of con
text in Homer in which Someone speaks of what is tetelesmenon·
:

Λ

Then among them spoke also the godlike (theoeidës)Theoclymenus, saying:
’Honored wife of Odysseus, son of Laertes, he truly has no clear
understanding (ou sapha oiden ) ; but do thou hearken to my words, for
with certain knowledge will I prophesy to thee (atreketrs gar soi manteusomai),
and will hide naught. Be my witness Zeus above all gods, and this hospitable
board and the hearth of noble Odysseus to which I come, that verily Odysseus
is even now in his native laud, resting or moving, learning of these evil
deeds, and he is sowing the seeds of evil for all the wooers. So plain a
bird of omen did I'mark as I sat on the benched ship, and I declared it to
Telemachus1 Çod. XV, 536].
'
Then wise Penelope answered him:
’Ah, stranger, I, would that this word
of thi r.e might be fulfilled (epos tetelesmenon ele).1
^ m u A m s n ií

« ιμ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ ιμ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ μ
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These passages, and others in Homer
provide ample justification for reading tetelesmenon eipôn as "speaking or saying what is brought to pass". This fits well in the
context of line 3 of B 34, since it is obvious that one kind of thing that one might
succeed in saying is a true prediction about future events. One can also connect this
with ta malista since some persons might be thought to ’succeed above all ethers in.
saying what comes to pass. ’32 The full message of line;»3-4 is that even if one suc
ceeded above others in speaking of what is brought to pass, still he himself does not
know, but belief or opinion is alloted to all things.
It is not yet clear whether B 34, in its entirety, espouses a general soepticis
or simply scepticism about the claims to knowledge of those who succeed in correctly
predicting events, but this latter scepticism is present in lines 3-4 and does serve
as tna basis for Xenophanes’ claim in lines 1-2. Xenophanes’ scepticism then involves
at least in part, an implicit repudiation of a central figure in Greek religion, the
oracle or prophet, and a repudiation as well of the stature enjoyed by these figures
in the Homeric epic. Yet doubts, about the infallibility of prophets had already
appeared in Homer, and the trustworthiness of divination was a re-current theme in
classical literature.33 So while Xenophanes’ scepticism about divination is révolu
tionary, as a repudiation of the entire enterprise, it is not wholly without prece
dent.
It should also be noted that the passage quoted at length from Οέ. XVII, 153
££. not only links up prophecy with saying what is tetelesmenon,but also displays a
connection, found elsewhere in Homer, between the gift of prophecy possessed by the
mantic seer and ’sure' or 'clear’ knowledge (Theoclymenus claims that Telemachus ou
sapha olden, but that he himself will give an exact or certain (atrekeos) prophecy).
The form saphes which appears in line 1 of B34 does not appear in Homer, but sapha,
knowing and sapha speaking do occur. : To say or know in a way which is sapha is, at
the very least, to say or know what is true .(cfi-.Il.. II, 404: "Son of Atraus uttei
not lies (me pseude) when thou knowest how to speak truly (sapha aipein)"., but it com
monly carries a special emphasis on knowing or saying the full, clear, and detailed
truth (cf. Od. XVII, 106: "tell me sapha of the return of thy father"). On occasion
it serves to characterize not what is known, but rather the manner in which something
is .known, and designates a knowing that is sure, certain, or expert (cf. II. X?, 632:
"unskilled (ou sapha eidos) to fight a wild beast"; II. XX 201 - 432, "I know well
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verily shalt thou know of a surety (sapha eiseai) man to man what manner of chieftans
there be among the Danaans”). It is such certain knowledge that is claimed by Pulydamas (II. XII, 228 £f.: "on this wise would a soothsayer interpret* one that in his
mind had clear knowledge (sapha thumoa eldeitr) of omens, and to whom the folk gave
ear"). Athene, disguised as Mentes, speaks to Telemachus (Od. I . 200 ff.): I will
now prophesy to thee as the immortals put it in my heart, and as I think it shall be
brought to pass (teleesthai), though I am in no wise a soothsayer (mantis), nor one
versed in the signs of birds (oioriOti sapha eidgs). Although Athene is not portrayed
as claiming to be sapha eidtrs in such matters (indeed any claim of prophetic wisdom
would be at odds with her disguise in purely mortal form), the fact that she claims to
be neither a prophet nor one skilled in signs of birds indicates that such skill is
typically claimed by the p r o p h e t . T h u s when Xenophanes asserts in B34 that no man
has seen or known to saphes it is quite possible that he had in mind a sure or certain
knowledge of this sort. Since lines 3-4 concede that someone might succeed in saying
what comes to pass, it is unlikely that Xenophanes wishes to deny that men sometimes
attain truth. Since these lines serve as Xenophanes' reason (ear) for denying that
men apprehend what is saphes, or in a manner which is saphes,35 it is likely that he
intends to deny that men ever enjoy sure or certain knowledge of the truth, even if
they do sometimes succeed in saying it (and can, as in line 4, believe or suppose that
it is true).
It is now possible, 1 believe, to see Xenophanes' remarks as a reflection of,
and in part as a reaction against, some basic ways of thinking that were embedded in
archaic poetry and religion. While adopting the traditional contrast between human
and divine capacities, especially the capacity to know, he rejected the belief that
this gulf is bridged by the intervention of divine beings in mortal form, or that the
gods somehow speak to men through signs or inspired prophets. Xenophanes' repudiation
of divination was probably based on his own positive theology and his de-anthropomorphized cosmology, and is one facet of his attack on the religion of Homer and Hesiod.
He denied that men who correctly predict events thereby possess knowledge, and this re
pudiation of knowledge by divination seems to have led him to adopt a general scepticism
about the capacity Of mere mortals to attain sure or certain knowledge and knowledge
about the gods and everything else of which Xenophanes speaks.
But there is a remaining problem. The inference is monumentally fallacious:
diviners who claim to know the future really do not know, therefore no man has had cer
tain knowledge of the truth nor will there ever be anyone who has knowledge about the
gods and everything else of which I speak. How could Xenophanes have reached a general
sceptical position simply from the failure of some men to know some things?
IV - The Grounds for Xenophanes' Scepticism
Since Sapheneia was thought to be possessed by the gods alone (as in Alcmaeon
Bl), it might be argued that B34 does not reject the possibility of all human knowledge.
but simply asserts that no man ever enjoys the clear and certain knowledge, possessed
by the gods, especially the one god who is greatest above gods and men. If so, then
the failure of seers and oracles to gain knowledge even when they speak truly, could
be viewed as a reasonable basis on which to doubt that any men ever shares in the syn
optic and certain knowledge of the gods. So the argument is not: since some men don't
know 3ome things, no one knows anything, but rather: since those who could be most
expected to share in the knowledge of the gods fail to do so, then no man ever does so
(even if they can acquire knowledge by their own inquiry).
This proposal has some merit, but it falls short of being a convincing account.,
for reasons that became clear in our discussion of earlier attempts to restrict the
scope of Xenophanes' scepticism: while line 1 denies knowledge of what is saphes, line
2 denies knowledge (without specification of type) of the gods and everything else of
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which he speaks; line 4 asserts only that belief or seeming is allotted to all things,
and B18 does not say that men acquire knowledge through their own seeking. It is
simply unreasonable to think that a man who says no man knew or will know with respect
to everything, and that belief f~: seeming is assigned to everything means to say im
plicitly that som? men do knew something. The proposal must be rejected. What is
useful however in this first attempt to mitigate the fallaciousness of Xenophanes" in™
ference is its recognition of seers and oracles as paradigms of a sort; they, if'any
one, could be expected to share in the knowledge of the gods.36 To complete the
account, we must explain how, n two different respects, Xenophanes argues for a gen
eral sceptical thesis on the grounds that since the conditions necessary for knowledge
are not met even in the most promising or favorable circumstances, they are never sat
isfied.
The first paradigm is referred to in line 3 of B34 — even if someone should
succeed above others in saying what is brought to pass, still he does not know. What
must be remembered is the. rather obvious point that the most favorable or promising
case that could be made for the art of divination is its track record, i.e. a citation
of instances where the predictions made by seers and oracles turned out to be right.
This was in fact the kind of "proof" supplied on occasion by those who claim to pos
sess prophetic powers.37 Thus, although mantike is not explicitly mentioned in line
3, Xenophanes is challenging what is in fact the most favorable case to be made for
knowledge through divination, and claiming that even when one someone succeeds in say
ing truly what comes to pass, he still does not know. His reason for this claim is
not stated but as I have already suggested, it is likely tied to his own conception
of the gods and his alternative naturalistic explanation of omens and portents of
various sorts. Since divination does not supply knowledge, given even the most favor
able outcome, it can be reasonably concluded that we cannot acquire knowledge by means
of its techniques.
It should also be noted that while foreknowledge was perhaps the most charac
teristic claim of the diviner, and successful prediction its strongest support, divini
ty cn was by no means confined to the future. The most famous seer in Homer, Calchas,
ii described as ""the best of diviners who knows things that were, and were to be, and
that had been before" (II.. II, 330). We do not generally know the sorts of questions
put co the famous oracles at Delphi and elsewhere, but the leaden tablets excavated
at Bodona display a variety of topics on which the oracle was consulted. These in
clude questions about the past and present, as well as the future.38 Epimenides, who
received Xenophanes" rebuke, is described by Aristotle as one "who did not practise
divination about the future, only about the obscurities of the past" (Rhet., 1418a21
ft.). Thus, a repudiation of mantikg would result not only in a scepticism about the
diviner’s capacity to know the future, but an equal scepticism about their capacity
to penetrate the obscurities of the present and past.
But why would it follow from the failure of these men to know anything, that no
man has known or will know anything? The answer lies in the status of seers and ora
cles as paradigm cases, and in the background assumptions about knowledge which were
well established in the poetic tradition both preceding and enduring after Xenophanes’
time. Part of this background has been already stated:
"men could have no certain
knowledge, that was reserved for God". What needs to be added is only, as Guthrie,
puts it, "a commonplace of poetry, expressed in invocations to the muses and else/here, that mankind had no sure knowledge unless the gods chose to reveal.it."35 This
conception of knowledge through divine revelation or inspiration is explicit in Homer
(e.g. in the introduction to the Catalogue of Ships at II. II, 484-433’ the gods know
everything and mortals know nothing unless the gods choose to reveal it) and Hesiod
(Theogeny, 26 f£.), and it occurs in the writings of later philosophers. Parmenides
presents his. way of truth as a revelation from "the goddess who leads the man who
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knows through every town” and Parmenides "will learn all things” even though "there is
no truth in the beliefs of mortals" (D-K Bl). Empedocles also dismisses the claims of
mere mortals to have comprehended the truth (D-K B2), but he invokes the muse to lead
him on to the heights of wisdom (D-K B3). Not uncharacteristically, Empedocles linked
his special insight with the attainment of semi-divine status (D-K B112).· In short,
given the 'poetic epistemology' of Xenophanes' time, the attainment of certain know
ledge requires either an ascent of mortals to the level of the gods or a descent of
the gods into human affairs, and Xenophanes denies that either of these ever occurs.
The first of these is made clear by Xenophanes' refusal to think that someone could be
both mortal and immortal (cf. A13: if they are gods, do not lament for them, if they
are men, do not sacrifice to them), and the second possibility is ruled out as 'unfit
ting* for the true divinity. If one views certain knowledge as the prerogative
of the
gods, and makes, as FrHnkel
puts it, "the chasm between the here and the beyond
un
bridgeable" (ibid., p. 130), a scepticism concerning human knowledge becomes logically
inescapable.
I

Given these assumptions, B34 becomes clear and coherent; mankind has no certain
knowledge unless the gods impart it to us, or some men succeed in attaining the status
of the gods. But the gods do not come among us and they do not speak to us either in
their own voices or through signs and oracles. Those who might be most thought to en
joy revealed knowledge of the truth do not do so, for even if they succeed above
others in saying what comes
to pass, still they do not know, and belief is allotted to
all things.. So the certain
truth no man has seen nor will there ever be anyone
who
has knowledge about the gods and everything else of which I speak.
I
have argued that a clear, consistent, and coherent interpretation of Xeno
phanes' scepticism can be provided by attending to the religious and poetic tradition
in which he stood, and we can now also gain a more realistic appreciation of his
achievements. His scepticism is not likely to appeal to contemporary philosophers;
it rests on assumptions about knowledge and divine revelation which are no longer
widely believed, and it is closely tied to aspects of Homer's religion which are now
mainly of historical interest. Nor can he, without exaggeration, enjoy the status of
being an early proponent of the theories of later Greek sceptics or modern philosophi
cal views of the nature and growth of scientific knowledge. There are similarities
between his sceptical; thesis and the conclusions of the later sceptics, but the
grounds for his scepticism are very different from theirs, and there is no good reason
to think that he espoused Popper’s 'principle of rational knowledge'.
What is noteworthy in Xenophanes' thought is his articulation of the contrast
between belief and knowledge,, and his contention that whatever truth is to be gained
must come as a result of human initiative and inquiry. While he remained too much a
traditionalist to think that this could result in certain knowledge, for that was
reserved for the gods, he did believe that men could discover what resembled the
truth, or what was at least likely to be true. None of this, it seems to me, consti
tutes the emergence of a 'robust empiricism', but Xenophanes' call for investigation,
his repudiation of divination, and his related demythologized cosmology, constitute a
departure from earlier ways of thinking that is justly thought of as revolutionary.
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Footnotes
1 Except where noted to the contrary, the Greek text of the fragments is taken
from Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edition rev. W. Kranz, 3 vols. (Ber
lin, 1952). Hereafter cited as D-K. Selections from Xenophanes are cited by number
and letter (A: leben und lehre. B: fragmente).

2 It is quoted by Sextus Empiricus in this form on three occasions (Adv. Math.
VII, 49, 110; VIII, 326, and dokos d ' epi pasi tetuktai is quoted at Pyrrh. Hyp. II,
18). Plutarch has genet * for iden in the first line, but this has been rejected in
D-Kv following FrMnkel1s argument in "Xenophanesstudien", Hermes 60 (1925) since
genet * requires a separation of to saphes from eidüs that is impossible in genuine
Archaic style. Further textual sources are listed in Guthrie, A History of Greek Phi
losophy (Cambridge U. P., 1967), Vol. I, p. 395. Frankel's paper has been translated
by M. R. Cosgrove and A. P. D. Mourelatos and included in the latter's The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York, 1974), pp./118-131. Subsequent ref
erences to FrMnkel are to this translation of his paper.
3
According to Diogenes Laertius (Lives IX, 20), "Sotion says that he was the
first to maintain that all things are incognizable, but Sotion is in error” (Hicks
trans.).
^ See for example, FrMnkel: "saphes unites the notion of completeness...with
that of reliable, faithful, and unadulterated apprehending" (ibid., p. 127). A fuller
discussion appears later in this paper (Section III).
D-K A24 (Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, Eel. II, 1, 17) : hôs ara theos men oide
tnn algtheian, dokos d ' epi pasi tetuktai, and Varro in Augustine, De Civ. Dei 7, 17:
hominis est enim haec opinari, Dei scire.
^ D-K 24B1: peri ttrn aphaneôn. peri ton thnëtôn. saphëneian men theoi echonti,
hers de anthrppois tekmairesthai. The text is not certain. While a contrast between
divine knowledge and mortal conjecture is clear, it might be read with equal sense,
"concerning the non-evident, the gods have a clear understanding, concerning things
mortal, men merely conjecture from signs", or perhaps "concerning things mortal, the
gods have a clear understanding, concerning things non-evident, men merely conjecture
from signs."
7
Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (Boston, 1953),
esp. Ch. 7 "Human Knowledge and Divine Knowledge Among the Early Greeks” . See, for
example, the prelude to the ’catalogue of ships' in the Iliad: "for you are goddesses,
you are at hand and know all things, but we hear only a rumor and know nothing" (485486); Theognis, Elegiac Poems (141-2): "we men practise vain things, knowing nought,
while the gods accomplish all to their mind." For further examples, see Guthrie, pp.
398-399. This contrast, coupled with a conception of logos as human contrivance,
forms the basis for UnterSteiner's view of B34 (cf. Mario Untersteiner, Senofane
(Firenze, 1967), esp. pp. ccix-ccxxvi.

8

Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, ed. D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen (London,
1970), p. 152. Popper's paper appeared originally in P. A. S. (N. S.) 59 (1958-59);
a similar account is given in his Conjectures and Refutations (London, 1963).
^ To make Popper's thesis even remotely plausible, we must read tetelesmenon
eipTfa in B34, as 'saying the final or complete truth', but (as will be developed in
detail later) telelesmenon has an ordinary sense of of that which is completed, made
actual, or brought about, and perhaps also, following FrMnkel, that which is real or
present. In neither case can-fcstelesmenon eipPn be taken as 'saying that which is the
complete or final explanation or theory'.
10 Even so, Aristotle's view is that knowledge is gained not through the refutation
of previous conjectures, but, so far as possible, their confirmation. Juet prior to
the discussion of incontinence Aristotle states, "Here as in other cases we must set
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4

down the phcinomena and begin by considering the difficulties, and so go on to vindi
cate if possible all the common conceptions about these states of mind, or at any rate
most of them and the most important” (ME VII 1, 114Sb2-6). We are indebted to G. E.
L. Owen's "Tithenai ta Phainomena11 (in Aristote et les problèmes de la méthode, Lou
vain, 1961) for an appreciation of the extent to which phainomena means not 'the
observed facts", but "common conceptions” (endoxa).
H Ibid,, p. 152. Snell (ibid.) also assumes that what men discover is knowledge,
and* though he seems not to realize it, this makes his, characterization of Xenophanes'
doctrine dangerously close to an explicit inconsistency. He attributes the following
views to Xenophanes: "human knowledge is in its essence deceptive" (p. 139), "only
apparent knowledge" (p. 140), "fallacious" (p. 141) , and "men acquire knowledge .
through their own striving (p. 140), "man's own initiative, his industry and zeal, be
come crucial for the acquisition of knowledge" (p. 140), "knowledge consists of the
data gained from inquiry and search" (p. 140). I find his one attempt' to reconcile
these two positions exceptionally opaque: "knowledge as su^h is obscure, but it is
illumined by searching" (p. 140).
*-2 gee for example, Lehrer's "Why Not Scepticism?,’
'
1 Philosophical Forum ii (1971),
pp. 283-98.
13 '
I do not think we can exclude the possibility.of iden being a kind of 'mental
seeing'. Homer had already spoken of 'mental seeing' (idesthai en phresin) and what
is saphes (clear, certain, true) is more naturally thought of as propositions,
accounts, stories, rather than the objects of sense perception.
^ It is at least worth noting that eidenai, although etymologically connected
with verbs of seeing, had already by the time of Homer acquired a broader sense in
which one could consistently say, "I know (oida) even though I have not seen". The
following passage is from Bk. XX of the Iliad. 203 ff.:
...we know (idmen) each others parents and lineage, for we have heard tales
told in olden days by mortal men, but with sight of eyes hast thou never
seen [known] my parents nor I thine (opsei d' out' ides) (Murray trans.),
Cf. also, Heitsch, "Das Wissen des Xenophanes," Rheinisches Museum für Philologie 109
(1966), pp. 193-235, and Iliad VI, 150; Hesiod. Theogeny 53-62. 915-17.

•jp

Frinkel's later paraphrase indicates that he does not adhere to his early trans
lation ("and what is precise no man has seen") and adopts the expansion I have sugges
ted "to men saphg£ an£íitS!£§. £üàâî£ SS2iü SH pantôn ge pragmatôn peri: a re. able
knowledge
th respect to all of the objects spoken of here, particularly concerning
the gods, is not possible for men" (p. 128).
16 Charles H. Kahn, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology (New York,
1960), p. 134.
U Plato tells the story of Epimenides' visit to Athens and his prophecy about the
Persian invasion (Laws, 642d-e, see also the 0. C. D . , p. 331). Aristotle also refers
to him as a seer at Rhet. 1418a21ff.
18
"Xenophanes kai Epicouros anairousi tgn- mantiken," Aetius, Placita, V, 1, 1
(D-K A52),

IQ
O f these *— to mention the most ancient — Xenophanes of Colophon, while assert
ing the existence of gods, was the only one who repudiated divination in its entirety
(divinationem funditas sustulit)", Cicero, De Divinatione, Falconer trans. (Loeb), I,
iii, 5.
^ The most detailed and comprehensive study of Greek divination is still BouchéLeclercq, Histoire de la Divination dans l'Antiquité, 3 Vols. (Paris, 1879-82). His
discussion of Xenophanes (Vol. I, pp. 33-34) treats the attack on divination as a con
sequence of Xenophanes' conception of god's majesty, and influential primarily in the
Sicilian comedians' (Aristoxenes»Epicharmus) attacks on les devins de carrefour.

-14 Other valuable accounts of the extraordinary techniques employed by professional and
amateur seers are provided by W. R. Halliday, Greek Divination (Chicago, 1913); R.
Flaceliere, Greek Oracles, D. Garmah trans. (New York, 1965); and Μ. P. Nilsson,
Greek Folk Religion (New York, 1948), esp. "Seers and Oracles", pp. 121-139.

21 Nilsson,

ibid., p. 136. Sophocles expresses a scepticism about divination (0.
T . , 499-512) which closely paralîëls what I think is Xenophanes* thesis: the gods
have perfect knowledge, but there is no sure test (krisis alethgs) that a mortal seer
(mantis) attains knowledge even if he excels above others in his skill of interpreting
omens (sophia). Cf. the summary by J. C. Kamerbeck, "The contrast between divine and
human knowledge [men — de] explains their scepticism as to the truth of Teiresias*
words, based on their faith in Oèdipus." (The Plays of Sophocles (Leiden, 1967), p.
120.). The summary statement of 499-512 given above is based on the translation by
Richard Jebb, Sophocles, The Plays and Fragments (Amsterdam, 1966).
22 E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1951), p. 196, n. 7.
^5 Nilsson, ibid., p. 92, 121.
24
Flaceliere, ibid., p. 18.
25 cf. Flaceliere, ibid., "Divination by Signs". Xenophanes is said to have
visited Etna and commented on the periodic frequency of volcanic eruptions (Aristotle,
De Mirab., 833al5). We are also told, though the reason is not given, that Xenophanes
disapproved of dice (A16). These fragments are however not obviously related to his
attack on divination.
26
Epicurus* naturalistic explanations of celestial phenomena consistently follow
those given by Xenophanes, though he; is not mentioned by name: "the rising and set
ting of the sun, moon, and stars may be due to kindling and quenching (anapsin kai
sbesin)" ; or it. may be due to "their coming forward above the earth or by its inter
vention"; eclipse of the sun may be due to the quenching of its light (kata sbesin);
lightning may be due to the motion of atoms in the clouds; comets are due to fires in
the heavens, etc. (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X, 91-93, 96-98, 101, 111). While Epi
curus concedes that the facts allow for a plurality of explanations, he insists that
the exclusion of myth is a necessary condition (monon ho mythos apesto) for understand
ing and peace of mind (103). ■
27
Letter to Herodotus in Diogenes Laertius, Lives, X, 76. Following Epicurus,
Lucretius attacks religious superstition on the basis of alternative physical, explana
tions of the motions of heavenly bodies, eclipses, lightning, clouds, rain, volcanic
eruptions, the seasons, plagues, rainbows, etc. (De Rerum Natura, V, VI).
FrHnkel, ibid., p. 126.
29

At one point FrHnkel translates tetelesmenon eipon as ‘'saying something which
turns out to be true", but he later discards this in favor of 'articulating what is
really present' (ibid., pp. 126-127). Guthrie (ibid., p. 395, n. 4) characterizes
tetelesmenon as 'a typically Homeric word* but does not indicate what it typically
means in Homer.
50 cf. r . J. Cunliffe. A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect (1924), p. 337. A great
many more examples could be provided by broadening the criterion to include variant
verbs for 'speaking* (e.g. agoreu? — to speak publicly) and other forms of tele? (e.g.
the prediction of Calchas at II. II, 330).
55 cf. the predictions of Melantheus (Od. XVII, 229), Antinous (Od. XVIII, 82),
Odysseus (Od. XIX, 547).
32
Seers and oracles are of course the paradigm cases, but the description could
refer to anyone who succeeds in correctly predicting the future. According to Diogenes
Laertius (Lives, I , 23) Xenophanes admired Thales for his ability to predict eclipses
and set the solstices, b . L. van der Waerden (following an explanation given by M.
Schramn) accounts for Thales' prediction by pointing out that Thales predicted only

- 15 that an eclipse would occur in a certain year (Herodotus, History, I, 74) and, given
enough background information about preceding lunar and solar eclipses, it was possi
ble to discover that in some years solar eclipses were likely to occur (Science Awaken
ing I I ; The Birth of Astronomy (New York, 1974), pp. 120-122). Xenophanes* admira
tion for Thales (assuming the accuracy of the story), need not be at odds with his
scepticism about divination, since he may have credited Thales with 'skill in conjec
ture', not knowledge. Euripides adopts this position when he says that "the good pro
phet is the man skilled in conjecture"·
(Hel., 744-757), Plato credits the oracles
and prophets with 'well-aimed conjecture' (eudoxia) but insists that this is still
only true opinion, not knowledge (Meno, 99c).
33
In Book II of the Odyssey, Eurymachas tells the prophet Halitherses to go home
and prophesy to his children, for 'many are the birds who under the sun's rays wander;
not all of them mean anything' (181-2), "Nor do we care for any prophecy (theopropiës),
which you, old sir, may tell us, which will not happen, and will make you even more
hated" (mytheai akraarton, apechthaneai d* eti malion, 202)
See also Hector's scorn
for the prophecy from birds given by Pulydamas (II. XII, 228ff.: "one bird only is
best, one omen — to fight for our country"). Aristophanes was later to ridicule the
soothsayers in The Knights and The Birds. Sophocles' Oedipus Rex contains occasional
sceptical remarks about the reliability a n d .legitimacy of prophecy (lines 500-515) but
since Teiresias' prediction is ultimately confirmed, one cannot suppose that Sophocles'
intention was to undermine confidence in divination. Divination was not repudiated by
either Plato or Aristotle, at least not in all its forms, and it was defended by the
Stoics. The most extensive criticism among later philosophers was provided by the
Epicureans, as can be seen in the remarks of the Epicurean Boethos in Plutarch's dia
logue. On the Pythian Oracles : "...the Sibyls and Bakis have foretold every sort of
event and misfortune: if it so happens that a number of them have come to pass, none
theless at the time they were uttered their prophecies were lies, even if fortuitous
circumstances should eventually appear to make them true." Quoted in Flaceliere,
ibid., p. 81.
Λ /

So characteristic in fact that it becomes natural to speak of the prophets them
selves as saphgs — sure or unerring (cf. Liddell and Scott: saphgs; for example, the
description of Teiresias in Sophocles' Oed. Rex, 286: saphestata).
35
The syntax of saphes (direct object of iden, accusative of respect, or adverbial
accusative) is unclear, but I do not see that a reasonable interpretation of the frag
ment presupposes a definitive answer. What is saphes may be what is not known, or it
may be the respect in which one does not know, or the manner in which one does not
know. The important point is that saphes iden and eidgs in lines 1-2 are set in clear
contrast (men —- de) with dokos in line 4. Denniston cites this fragment as an example
of an oun (in to men oun saphes) emphasizing a prospective men (The Greek Particles
(Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 473). This contrast makes it unlikely that
to saphes functions as an independent sentence (as, for example in Cleve's: "and this
is sure by all means").
3(3
The great importance of seers and oracles in both public and private affairs is
perhaps sufficiently well known to need further argument. One need only point to the
great popularity of the traditional oracles at Delphi,Dodona, and Claros (near Colo
phon), and according to Herodotus, the incessant use made of seers in military matters
as the clearest evidence of the exalted position which they enjoyed. The major role
played by diviners in Greek religion is explained in detail by Nilsson, ibid., pp. 123139.
37
In Book II of the Odyssey, Haliterses predicts the fate that is to befall Pene
lope's suitors, and then argues:
"I who foretell this am not untried, I know what I am saying. Concerning
him, I say that everything was accomplished in the way I said it would be
at the time the Argives took ship for Ilion, and with them went resourceful

- 16 Odysseus. I said that after much suffering, with all his companions lost,
in the twentieth year, not recognized by any, he would come home. And
now all this is being accomplished (nun panta teleitai)." (170-176, Lattimore trans.).
A similar defense is offered by Euthyphro, the self-proclaimed theological expert in
Plato's Euthyphro (3c), when he complains of his reception in the assembly: "When I
tell them in advance what will occur they laugh at me, and yet I have never made a
prediction that did not come true."
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Included among those questions recorded were these: whether a man's wife will
bear him a child, whether the child which his wife is carrying is actually his, whe
ther a man will do Well by breeding sheep, and, my favorite, "Agis asks Zeus Naios and
Dione whether he lost the blankets and pillows himself or whether they were stolen by
someone outside the household." For other examples see C. Caraponos, Dodone et ses
ruines (Paris, 1878) pp. 68 ff., and the Bulletin de Corr. Hell.. 83(1959), pp. 66973.
,
/
^ Ibid., p. 398. It has been thought that Xenophanes rejected the view that mor
tals derive their knowledge from the gods, and held instead that men gain knowledge
through their own inquiry (Snell, ibid., 139-144; John Robinson, An Introduction to
Early Greek Philosophy (New York, 1968), pp. 55-56). But this is not implied by the
fragments. Xenophanes denies that the gods revealed all things to mortals from the
beginning and he repudiates divination, but he nowhere rejects the assumption that if
knowledge is to be attained at all by mortals, it must come by divine revelation. What
man can discover through seeking is 'the better' (B18) which can easily be the dokos
of B34, and which may resemble or be similar to what is true (B35). One relevant frag
ment on this issue is the tantalizingly brief B36: hopposa de thnetoisi pephenasin
eisorasthai, "as many as they have revealed to mortals to look upon." But it does not
say anything about knowledge. The major obstacle in the path of thinking that Xeno
phanes espouses knowledge gained through inquiry is one of consistency. Like Snell,
Robinson seems untroubled by attributing to Xenophanes the following: "only through
patient inquiry does the truth come to be known" and "the truth itself is known only
to god" (ibid., p. 56).
^ I wish to express my gratitude to the following persons for their assistance
in the preparation of this paper; G. B. Kerferd, A. P. D. Mourelatos, Blair Edlow,
David Glidden, David Ronstan, Ronald Swigger, Carl Brumbach, and William Sewell. I
am especially indebted to Gregory Vlastos for his criticisms of an earlier version of
this paper, and to Martha Nussbaum, for her trenchant criticisms given during a dinner
conversation. They produced a mild case of indigestion and a major revision of my
interpretation of B34.

